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Abstract: Electoral psychology is defined as any model based on human psychology that is used to 
explain any electoral experience or outcome at the individual or aggregate level. Electoral 
psychology can also be an interface with other crucial aspects of the vote. For example, the interface 
between electoral psychology and electoral organization constitutes electoral ergonomics. The very 
nature of the models tested in electoral psychology has also led scholars in the field to complement 
mainstream social science methodologies with their own specific methodological approaches in 
order to capture the subconscious component of the vote and the subtle nature of the psychological 
processes determining the electoral experience and the way in which it permeates citizens’ thoughts 
and lives. After defining electoral psychology, this introductory article scopes its analytical roots 
and contemporary relevance, focuses on the importance of switching from “institution-centric” to 
“people-centric” conceptions of electoral behavior, and notably how it redefines key concepts such 
as electoral identity and consistency, and approaches questions of personality, morality, memory, 
identity, and emotions in electoral psychological models. Then, it discusses some of the unique 
methodological challenges that the field faces, notably when it comes to analyzing largely 
subconscious phenomena, and addresses them, before explaining how the various contributions to 
this Special Issue give a flavor of the scope and approaches of electoral psychology contributions to 
electoral studies. 
 
1. What is Electoral Psychology? 
The last decade has been quite unique when it comes to elections and electoral results across 
world democracies. A number of outcomes have shocked much of the world from the victory of 
“Leave” in the UK referendum on membership of the European Union of 23 June 2016 to the election 
of Donald Trump as US President in November of the same year, not to mention the coalesced victory 
of the Lega and the Five Star Movement in Italy in March 2018, or on the polar opposite end of the 
“liberal centrism” scale, that of Emmanuel Macron as French President in May 2017.  
Perhaps less obvious, but equally novel, many countries have returned hung parliaments or 
seemingly ungovernable legislatures across the Western world, for example, two hung parliaments 
in a mere seven years in the UK (2010 and 2017) in a system more aligned to straightforward one-
party majorities, with another general election to be held in December 2019. Similarly, unexpected 
volatility resulted in hung parliaments in Sweden and Australia, in 2010. Moreover, during recent 
months, a series of multiple highly contested elections have plagued government formation in Spain 
and in Israel, in 2019, where parties failed to form agreements and the electorate was called to the 
polling stations with an unprecedented regularity.  
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At the same time, there has been several instances of surprisingly democratic good news. The 
inevitable pessimism that arose from the assumption that electoral turnout was on a progressively 
permanent decline was also met with concerns about the participation of young people in particular. 
However, turnout in the 2019 European Parliament elections (a typical prototype of a second order 
election) unexpectedly surpassed all previous levels since the 1980s, as did youth turnout in the 2016 
EU membership referendum, and again in the 2017 UK General Elections. Indeed, youth turnout will 
be a focal point in the forthcoming General Election on 12 December 2019.  
The relevance of these counter-intuitive electoral phenomena is not purely historical, but 
analytical as well. As they occur, researchers increasingly realize that the models we use in much of 
the existing electoral research are ill-equipped to explain some of these paradoxes and that there is 
something about the individual and collective psychology of contemporary democratic voters across 
a whole variety of political systems that needs to be reintegrated into our approaches if we are to 
make sense of current electoral realities.  
This is where electoral psychology becomes relevant. It is defined as the use of any model based 
on human psychology to explain any electoral experience or outcome at the individual or aggregate 
level [1]. The human psychology determinants notably include personality, morality, memory, 
emotions, cognition, persuasion, and identity. The electoral experiences and outcomes focus in 
particular on participation, overall turnout, electoral choice and outcomes, the nature and 
connotations of the electoral experience (when, how, with whom, and with what thought people vote), 
electoral attitudes (including hope and hopelessness), perceptions of the electoral atmosphere, 
individual interpretations of context, election cycles, projections, and decision-making processes 
including timing, stability, habituation, and transformation, and a sense of electoral resolution or lack 
thereof. Electoral psychology can also be an interface with other crucial aspects of the vote. For 
example, the interface between electoral psychology and electoral organization constitutes electoral 
ergonomics.  
Beyond the unique range of questions that electoral psychology addresses, the very nature of 
the models it tests has also led scholars in the field to complement mainstream social science 
methodologies with their own specific methodological approaches in order to capture the 
subconscious component of the vote and the subtle nature of the psychological processes that 
determine the electoral experience and the way in which it permeates citizens’ thoughts and lives. 
These methods range from diaries and panel studies to visual, physiological, and field experiments.  
The multiple references to the psychology of voters and its shrouded mystery, the role of 
personality, memory, emotions, and electoral ergonomics are intrinsic to the study of electoral 
psychology and is the collective concern of this Special Issue. Here, authors who have largely defined 
the field of electoral psychology and its central concepts focus on analytical or empirical puzzles of 
contemporary electoral psychology. 
This introductory overview delineates the field, its analytical focus, its conceptual perspectives, 
and its signature methodologies. It also explains where electoral psychology sits in the broader 
landscape of electoral and behavioral sciences and draws commonalities with and differences from 
alternative approaches. It also explains the logic of the different contributions that are presented in 
this Special Issue and what they collectively tell us about the psychology of voters.  
2. Analytical Roots and Contemporary Relevance of Electoral Psychology Approaches 
In a world of ever-increasing political uncertainty and growing dissatisfaction, the question of 
what voting means to citizens and what emotions people experience at the very moment when they 
exercise their right to vote is perhaps more important than ever before. In studies of electoral 
psychology, we assess the act of voting, a unique moment of civic communion between a citizen and 
his or her political system, and try to understand the long-term development of a voter’s psychology 
and identity, and the way it acquires its consistency and logic throughout a citizen’s life, from 
childhood to death. One of the paradoxes of voting behavior in the current context is that most 
existing socioeconomic models typically explain why different individuals support one party or 
another, however, this assumes that citizens are defined by an electoral choice. In addition, recent 
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research by Bruter and Harrison suggested that 20% to 30% make up or change their minds within a 
week of the elections and that 29% of Americans and 40% of French voters changed their mind on 
the day of an election [1]. This insight into the very nature of the dynamics of electoral behavior and 
decision making requires us to reconsider the way in which we understand the mind of a voter.  
The study of voting behavior is rich in exciting contributions. Modern studies of political 
behavior can be traced back to the research by Lazarsfeld and the Columbia school in the 1940s [2,3]. 
The Columbia model promoted the use of surveys as the obvious method of electoral investigation 
and quickly tailored their model towards a sociological understanding of the vote. Another 
resounding triumph for the political psychology approach came with the Michigan model and The 
American Voter, a seminal piece which many still recognize as one of the most influential books in 
the history of political science [4,5]. Campbell et al. put partisan identification at the heart of citizens’ 
political behavior. Their model suggests that for reasons including socialization, social class, and 
environment, voters identify with a political party. This partisan identification is the ”baseline” of 
the vote, and as such combines with voters’ evaluations of short-term factors (candidates’ 
personalities, incumbent’s record, issues, etc.) to produce an electoral decision. 
However, while political scientists have long perceived the need to understand the 
psychological mechanisms behind voters’ attitudes, recent developments in political science have 
dedicated proportionally more attention to political sociology and political economy approaches and 
to electoral context than to psychological analyses of the vote. In the 1950s, Lane insisted that the role 
of individual personality on the vote was somewhat overlooked, and he would likely reach similar 
conclusions today [6]. Furthermore, our understanding of psychological models of the vote remains 
more than sociological and economic alternatives. In sociological and economic terms, we know ” 
dominant” models though must account for exceptions. By contrast, in electoral psychology, we often 
study exceptions but lack dominant models delineating the psychological leitmotiv behind citizens’ 
electoral behavior. The cognitive and emotional processes underlying the vote have often been 
paradoxically neglected as compared with social and demographic determinism or rational electoral 
preferences. Perhaps, the frontal opposition between cleavage-based and rational choice theories has 
left little space for distinct psychological models to develop.  
The centrality of partisan identification in psychological models of political behavior persisted 
in further influential studies such as Butler and Stokes, who refined the Michigan model of 
socialization, environment, and electoral change [7]. Partisan identity remained the centerpiece of all 
behavior, capable of absorbing most psychological and sociological paths to electoral choice. In both 
works, the electoral identity of a citizen is equal to (or essentially superimposed with) their partisan 
identity. However, their approach arguably overlooks essential questions about what elections 
represent. Partisan identification models limit the concept of electoral consistency to the relatively 
“superficial” level of partisanship. While this might—at a stretch—have made sense in an era of 
aligned politics, identity and consistency could register at a much deeper level (a certain ”conception” 
of politics, values, relationship between citizens and the state or as we shall see, role of a voter) which 
could be entirely dissociated from partisanship, notably in de-aligned contexts [8,9].  
3. Redefining Voter Consistency and Identity 
The context of dealignment is an excellent example of how the electoral psychology approach 
entirely changes the way electoral science looks at apparent electoral change or anomalies. From the 
point of view of partisan-centric models such as those described above, which Bruter and Harrison 
described as taking an “institutionalist view” of behavior, voters that move away from partisan 
alignments represent change and a citizen who votes for different parties at different points in time 
can come across as anomalous or incoherent unless one finds an institutionalist reason for their 
behavior (such as split ticket voting or second order election models) [1], from an electoral 
psychological point of view, however, this need not be the case. A citizen who votes for the left in the 
1980s and switches to the extreme right in the 2000s is not necessarily incoherent. Instead, there is 
almost certainly a psychological basis for internal consistency that is not accounted for by party-
centric models. Is it inconceivable that a floating voter who chooses new parties, or switches back 
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and forth with every incumbent disappointment, can express a coherent electoral identity (unrelated 
to partisanship) and exhibit a form of systematic behavior? Even Campbell and Miller had to consider 
the possibility that split-ticket voting could be intentional and part of a purposeful coherence [5,10–
12]. 
In fact, from an electoral psychology point of view, it would be inconceivable to consider de-
aligned voters as an anomaly or unexplainable, and not just because of the ample literature 
identifying the likely nature of realigned or de-aligned voters [13–15]. While partisan identification 
could still work in the simplified US party system, research in European electoral behavior faces 
complex definitions of electoral choice itself, often replacing party choice by propensity to vote (for 
example, [16–19]). In this context, the psychological consistency of voters must go beyond 
partisanship. 
Indeed, electoral psychology has been more about reclaiming psychological models of the vote 
away from institutional focus in favor of true behavior-centrism. For example, in the Michigan model 
of the vote, partisan identification is considered a deeply held psychological trait, or indeed, an ” 
identity” [4]. In addition, conceptually, given psychological insights into identity, it is hard to 
intuitively imagine partisanship as a foundational identity, and citizens only exceptionally refer to 
parties in their identity discourse [20]. Additionally, the analytical doubts surrounding the notion of 
a partisan model of identity does not mean that a (non-partisan) electoral identity does not exist and 
matter. Therefore, psychological approaches to behavior have progressively emancipated from 
partisan identity models, to dissociate electoral psychology from this iconic heritage, for instance, 
conceiving an alternative electoral identity based on the perceived role of a voter instead [1]. This 
concept pertains to the largely subconscious understanding of our role as a voter, including a 
referee/supporter model and empathic displacement, such as the link between the individual, 
collective, and societal dimensions of the vote. 
One of the fundamental aspects of the study of electoral psychology refers to personality, which 
encompasses traits, personality derivatives, morality, and sociotropism. Alongside personality, 
memory is also a critical facet that is essential to the understanding of electoral behavior and attitudes. 
This includes the assimilated recollection of sensorial perceptions and experiences from our 
childhood and first vote, to recent elections regardless of whether we choose to participate or not.  
While psychological approaches to elections do not undermine the usefulness of sociological 
and economic approaches to the vote, they introduce crucial elements such as personality, cognition 
(for instance memory), emotion, and an identity to models of political behavior, and dramatically 
filter, condition, and modify the impact of sociological or rational predictors. Bruter and Harrison 
push this rationale further and insist that in order to truly understand the nature of the psychology 
of voters, we must consider a triple inter-related dependent variable, that is, electoral behavior, 
electoral experience, and electoral resolution [1]. In this respect, they studied the emotionality of the 
electoral experience alongside electoral choice and participation and assessed the conditions in which 
elections lead to reconciliation or conversely create divisions and feed hostility.  
4. Memory, Personality, and the Vote 
Existing research such as that by Atkinson and Shiffrin and Squire illustrate that memory and 
identity are also likely to shape future behavior [21,22]. These studies show how memory is 
constructed, mobilized, and able to affect human behavior consciously and subconsciously. The 
Atkinson and Shiffrin model suggests that memory stems from three different types of registers, 
visual, auditory, and haptic [21]. Therefore, we remember the things we see, hear and say, or ”touch” 
(physically experience). This distinction is important to understand potential sources of electoral 
memory. In the short term, memories are stored through a sequence of rehearsal, coding, decision, 
and retrieval before potentially being transferred into the long-term memory. Squire argues that long-
term memory can be expressed in either a declarative (explicit) or a non-declarative (implicit) manner 
[22]. The former relies on remembering facts and events, while the latter relates to the assimilation of 
skills and habits, priming effects, classical conditioning, and non-associative learning. Therefore, 
electorally, we dissociate between explicit memories (what voters recall from the past) and implicit 
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mechanisms (unconscious habits and conditionings that voters reproduce). Finally, Bayliss et al. 
highlight three memory stages, the encoding (registration) of information, its storage (maintenance 
over time), and its retrieval (access through recognition, recall, or implicit reproduction) [23]. These 
insights capture the complex itinerary of an electoral image from experience to memory and its 
retrieval and mobilization in future elections. 
Historically, political scientists who have focused on memories of electoral choice have found 
that 10% to 20% of respondents misreport their choice [24–26]. Price et al. suggest that 
misrepresentation and rationalization based on the expected future vote is actually far more frequent 
[27]. Thus, many political scientists believe that citizens do not remember past elections. However, in 
the Atkinson and Shiffrin model, for example, electoral decision is neither an auditory, visual, nor 
haptic stimulus. Memories of past thought processes exist if they are salient but not otherwise and 
not when the mental process is subconscious. Moreover, visual memory of election adverts or election 
night, auditory memory of discussions or arguments, and haptic memories of the polling station 
experience could all exist simultaneously. Consequently, the experience of participating in an election 
should not be limited to the study of electoral choice, but should also involve an understanding of 
the rituals, feelings, and democratic interaction that also characterize this infrequent act of 
communion with the political system. 
Bruter and Harrison revealed some interesting findings regarding the electoral memory of 
citizens [1]. They reported that some recollections of elections are very ”physical”, for example, the 
impact of station location or the atmosphere during the campaign, on election day or even on election 
night. For example, 79% of US citizens remember images from election night. Citizens often recall 
specific elections citing infamous scandals or unexpected outcomes. In this respect, 94% of French 
voters remember 2002. Other memories are often individualized, for example, personal discussions 
about the election with friends and family members, or even arguments or disputes about the election. 
Memories of early electoral experiences are also incredibly important. Eighty-two percent of 
Americans recall the first election when they were eligible to vote, and 70% remember an election 
during their childhood years. This echoes the unique nature of the electoral psychology of young 
people [28]. 
Memories of elections are highly consequential for young citizens’ participation. Bruter and 
Harrison showed that an early experience of elections significantly increases propensity to participate 
[1]. In the USA, 48% of citizens that recall accompanying their parents to the polling station have 
voted in an election, while only 30% of those with no such memory have voted in an election. 
Furthermore, young people who do not go to vote in the first two elections that they are eligible to 
vote in are likely to become long-term habitual abstentionists. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the traditional alignment models of Lipset and Rokkan were subjected 
to the scrutiny that accompanied electoral change and increasingly volatile party systems [29]. As a 
result, a number of scholars started questioning the impact of personality on behavior. Greenstein 
dedicated his work to the impact of personality and the limits of ”political personality” studies within 
political science [30]. While most of his work focused on leaders (US Presidents) rather than voters, 
he reported that personality does matter in politics. However, psychologists frequently fail to agree 
on the fundamental concept of ”personality” and how it should be measured and operationalized. 
For example, Smith, Bruner et al. considered ”opinions” to be part of the personality concept [31], 
while Caprara, Schwartz et al. expanded their model to include ”values” [32]. Di Palma and 
McClosky highlighted the importance of conformity [33], and Sniderman and Lane preferred to view 
ideology as an extension of personality [34,6]. Most political scientists including Peterson et al. and 
Gosling et al. use the so-called ”Big Five” personality traits, i.e., extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience [35,36]. Some authors prefer to 
refer to the ”big-three” or ”alternative-five” personality traits [37] and Caprara, Schwartz et al. used 
discrete traits, friendliness, openness, energy, and conscientiousness, alongside specific values [32]. 
Research conducted by Boyle, Stankov et al. questioned the salience of the Big Five in that these 
specific traits account for only about half of normal personality characteristics [38], while Zillig, 
Hemenover et al. [39] and Paunonen and Jackson [40] highlighted various key, and often deeper, 
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personality traits that the schema of the Big Five do not encompass. Bruter and Harrison preferred to 
use a broader spectrum of personality traits that included elements of the ”Big Five” such as openness 
to experience and extraversion, alongside discrete traits such as personal rigidity, aversion to risk, 
aversion to change, sense of alienation, empathy, individualism, and long-term projection [1]. They 
also found that moral hierarchization has a significant impact on the electoral experience, attitudes, 
and behavior of citizens across democracies.  
5. Elections and Emotions 
Despite significant efforts [41,42] to bring emotions into political analysis, the study of emotions 
and elections is still relatively limited within the political science literature. Marcus et al. criticize the 
normative tendency of studies of emotions in the democratic literature and question their role in 
politics [43]. By contrast, the emotional nature of political experiences and behavior is highlighted by 
studies that show that identities are intrinsically twinned with emotions [20,44,41] and indeed in 
electoral campaigns and communication [45]. While emotions and reason are often described as the 
head and heart of a voter, recent research has moved away from perceiving emotion as purely 
affective, to suggest that there is instead a consistent interaction between them. Specific emotions 
such as hope, pride, sympathy, disgust, anger, and fear are used by the National Election Study to 
assess respondents’ characterization of US Presidential candidates [46]. Similarly, Lazarus focuses on 
the following six fundamental emotions: anger, guilt, fear (anxiety), sadness, hope, and happiness 
[47]. Moreover, Bruter and Harrison emphasize the crucial role of emotions as symptoms of electoral 
experience and capture them throughout the various ”moments” of the electoral process [1]. They 
also find that elections tend to be far more emotional for many citizens than often assumed, including 
those who do not care about politics.  
They notably show that elections can be a tearful experience for many citizens. Their findings 
show that 25% of Americans have already cried because of an election and an overwhelming 63% say 
that election night makes them feel emotional. In the UK, a third of voters reported having tears in 
their eyes on the night of the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, a proportion 
reaching nearly half among young people aged 18 to 24. Across elections and contexts, on election 
day itself, 60% feel excited in the polling booth, 74% feel proud, whereas 53% also say that it makes 
them feel worried. Harrison confirms the particular vividness of the emotion of young voters [28].  
As a result, emotions cannot be conceived as exogenous causes of electoral choice but can be 
interpreted as intrinsic markers of electoral experience. Thus, feeling happy, excited, emotional, or 
worried in the election is part of the electoral experience itself, an outcome of the democratic process, 
likely to both shape and be shaped by electoral behavior and closure. These contextualized emotions 
are, thus, seen to be influenced by a voter’s identity, memory, and personality, and by electoral 
ergonomics and atmosphere.  
6. Methodological Challenges 
The substantive scope of electoral psychology, discussed in previous sections, implies some 
specific and complex methodological challenges which often exceed those of other aspects of political 
science in general and the field of electoral behavior in particular.  
To start with, the focus on elements such as personality, memory, identity, and ergonomic effects 
make it extremely difficult to rely on self-reporting, whereas most political experience and behavior 
obey largely subconscious mechanisms. For example, even perfectly honest respondents cannot 
accurately tell us how they feel when they vote, why they vote as they do, or what dominates their 
electoral experience, because they are bound by the limits of their own knowledge and beliefs, which 
ignores their preponderantly subconscious logic. Lakoff and Johnson underline the immense 
preponderance (over 90%) of subconscious effects in political communication, and beyond in human 
behavior [48]. In addition, numerous neurological studies have shown that over 95% of a human 
decision is subconscious, and therefore taking self-reporting at face value is intrinsically problematic 
[49]. 
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As noted by Bruter and Harrison, while most political analysis include some subconscious 
components as either sources or consequences, or mechanisms of political behavior, electoral 
psychology is the only approach to prominently feature subconscious elements at all three of these 
levels [1]. Indeed, while people are never directly conscious of their own personality or the 
significance of their memory, neither would a conscious characterization of one’s emotions or 
experience ever be a sufficient and accurate measure of them. Therefore, this prominence of the 
subconscious in all aspects of electoral psychology models is the first foundational challenge of 
electoral psychology research which, as we will discuss, imposes a need for measures which cannot 
solely be based on self-reporting. 
A second difficulty pertains to the articulation between generalizable mechanics and 
idiosyncratic narratives in electoral psychological reality which has typically had a greater focus in 
multimethod approaches mixing quantitative and qualitative components in most existing electoral 
psychology research as compared with other fields of the discipline.  
Third, the nature of the dependent variables of interest in electoral psychology creates a need to 
understand complex dynamic causation without narrowly timed occurrence of dependent outcomes. 
In other words, whereas most electoral research focuses on electoral choice as the main or sole 
endgame of electoral patterns, electoral psychologists tend to focus on a much broader web of 
emotions, experiences, and behavior that can span multiple election cycles and constitute multiple 
layers of reciprocal causation or subsequent effects. This implies an almost infinite superimposition 
of short, medium, and long-term mechanisms often requiring complex and theoretically driven 
modeling of dynamic causation.  
Let us now consider the three methodological challenges in turn. First, the need to balance self-
reported and observational data is not frequently discussed but arguably is even more important. It 
relates to the importance of subconscious mechanisms in human (and electoral) behavior. While there 
is a generic case to be made to explore the subconscious, the risk of conscious distortion is particularly 
strong in electoral studies if only because most citizens only know of electoral opinion research in the 
context of election polls, the measurement of citizens’ preferences, and the prediction of electoral 
results. While this is a respectable field, its goals, foci, and methodological requirements differ from 
academic research, and over decades of electoral polling, democratic citizens have undoubtedly 
developed a strong sense of how polling results get interpreted by and affect elite behavior. We also 
need to strive for a balance between static and dynamic approaches in a bid to entangle cyclical effects 
and look at their durability and consistency over time.  
7. A Sample of Electoral Psychology Enquiries 
Drawing upon the conceptual, methodological, and substantive scopes and challenges of 
electoral psychology described above, this Special Issue highlights a sample of cutting-edge 
approaches and scientific enquiries that are symptomatic of the field.  
The following series of contributions define and discuss key concepts in electoral psychology. 
Eri Bertsou provides an excellent contribution to the discussion of the concept and measurement of 
distrust. Using qualitative evidence drawn from three national contexts to map the concept and its 
evaluative dimensions, his findings show that political distrust is entwined with the failure of 
representation and entails a fundamentally ethical dimension. Michael Bruter’s article defines the 
concept of electoral ergonomics as the interface between electoral psychology and electoral design. 
This contribution investigates the psychological effects that different types of electoral organization 
can have on electoral experience in terms of personality, memory, emotions, and identity. Using two 
case studies, he shows that young people seem more likely to vote for radical right parties if they 
vote using a postal ballot than in person at the polling station based on panel study evidence from 
the UK. The second example is derived from an experiment that tracks the deliberation time that 
citizens take when they are asked to vote using materialized or dematerialized mono-papers or poly-
paper ballots. Carol Galais and Andre Blais offer an application of electoral psychological 
mechanisms by analyzing the role of gender in perceptions and effects of the duty to vote. They use 
empirical data to test the role of political interest and moral predispositions on the observed gender 
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gap. Their findings confirm a significant but small gender difference in favor of men. In addition, 
they suggest that this could be due to lower levels of political interest reported by women than men. 
Finally, Sarah Harrison discusses the concept, nature, and consequences of democratic frustration. 
Using insights from the psychology literature, this contribution introduces and operationalizes the 
concept of democratic frustration to shed new light on pathologies of democratic crises. Specifically, 
it suggests that citizens become frustrated when a perceived democratic delivery deficit interacts with 
a strong democratic expectation or desire. The article tests this model using two original surveys run 
in the UK during the 2017 General Election and the 2019 European Parliament elections. 
Each contribution performs a different role highlighting key aspects of what electoral 
psychology is as an emerging subfield of study in electoral behavior and the wider political science 
discipline. Eri Bertsou’s, Michael Bruter’s, and Sarah Harrison’s articles present new crucial concepts 
in the field which include distrust, electoral ergonomics, and democratic frustration. In particular, 
the latter is also unique in that it shows how electoral psychology can use insights from the 
psychology literature to shed new light on political science and political behavior questions. Michael 
Bruter’s contribution specifically evaluates the interaction between electoral psychology and 
institutional design. Carol Galais’s and Andre Blais’s article is unique in that it analyses how an 
electoral psychology pattern can differ by citizens’ characteristics, in this case, gender, Finally, Eri 
Bertsou’s article is special in that it highlights how electoral psychology sometimes takes concepts 
“upside down” to change our insights on political behavior. Overall, the contributions each differ in 
their methods and approaches. Each of the elements is critical and without any one of them, the 
presentation of what electoral psychology is as a field of research and how it innovates conceptually, 
methodologically, and crossdisciplinarily would be deeply incomplete. 
Altogether, therefore, these contributions enable us to better understand the unique scope, 
challenges, approaches, and methods in electoral psychology, showcasing key methods from surveys 
and experiments to interviews and highlighting fundamental concepts which add new visions to the 
battery of more traditional variables historically used in the field of electoral science, since the 1950s.  
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